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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
RENNOLD PENDER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
T. C. JAcKSON and RuBY G. JAcKsoN, 
his wife, CHARLEs E. DAVEY, and 
JANE DoE DAVEY, whose true name 
is unknown, RALPH M. DAVEY, and 
BETH S. DAVEY, his wife, et al., 
Defendants CVJid Respondents. 
Case No. 7,896 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE CouNTY, STATE oF UTAH, 
H2.~0RAB~~ WILL L. HoYT, Judge 
F ~.}L ~~',JloN v. BACKMAN of ~hN 10 ,_~}-'BACKMAN, BACKMAN & CLARK 
------------------·----·c--·------·--t' ·----·""" and 
Clerk, Supreme Court, n~:~~s. JOHNSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
RENNOLD PENDER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
T. C. JAcKsoN and RuBY G. JAcKsoN, 
his \Yife, CHARLES E. DAVEY, and 
JANE DoE DAVEY, whose true name 
is unknown, RALPH M. DAVEY, and 
BETH S. DAVEY, his wife, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
CAsE No. 7,896 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
The nature of respondents' arguments and the de-
sire to inform the Court of other pertinent and relevant 
matters in relation thereto, impel the submission of this 
reply brief by appellant. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ARGUED 
The argument in this re~ply brief will he dire·cted 
towards refutation of the respondents' seven points, 
under the headings : 
POINT I 
ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF ADVERSE HOLDING IS 
EQUIVALENT TO OPEN, NOTORIOUS, AND HOSTILE POS-
SESSION OF LAND. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT DID TAKE POSSESSION OF THE 
GROUND, AND AS OCCUPANT USE IT FOR INVESTMENT, 
ETC., ADVERSELY. 
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POINT III 
APPELLANT'S ACTS OF POSSESSION WERE MORE 
THAN CASUAL, OCCASIONAL TRESPASSES-ACTUALLY 
ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
POINT IV 
DOCTRINE OF DAY VS. STEELE DOES NOT PRE-
CLUDE RECOVERY HERE BY APPELLANT-INAPPLICA-
BILITY. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT DID OCCUPY THE LAND CONTINU-
OUSLY, HOSTILELY, EXCLUSIVELY, OPENLY, AND NO-
TORIOUSLY. 
POINT VI 
TELONIS VS. STALEY DOCTRINE SHOULD STILL BE 
ABROGATED. 
POINT VII 
ALLEGED WRONGFUL ASSESSMENT OF NO AVAIL 
TO RESPONDENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF ADVERSE HOLDING IS 
EQUIVALENT TO OPEN, NOTORIOUS, AND HOSTILE POS-
SESSION OF LAND. 
Since respondents' initial point for argument [i.e. 
necessity for :possession that is continuous, hostile, open, 
notorious, and exclusive-Page 2, Respondents' Brief] 
contains a comprehensive list of subjects which are 
elsewhere more fully discussed in their brief, it is 
deemed best to make rebuttal argument on most of 
them under the later headings \vhere they are more 
fully set out, rather than under a heading \vhich is sup-
ported solely by a single brief quotation of la\\T as in 
their brief. 
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Respondents assume that IN ALL CASES, the no-
toriety, openness, and hostile character of appellant's 
possession must AS SUCH be shown and proven. This 
is not ALL the law, and ·without in anywise admitting 
that there "\Yas any lack of such notoriety, openness or 
hostility in appellant's occupation of the ground in 
question,-all of which appears more fully at rp~ages 6 
through 13 of Appellant's Brief heretofore submitted, 
"\Ve feel it incumbent to bring to the Court's attention 
the fact that notoriety, openness, and the hostile !Or 
adverse character of the claimant, are not always re-
quired to be shown as respondents assume, for, although: 
''It is essential to the acquisition of title hy 
adverse possession that the true owner shall have 
knowledge or notice, actual or constructive, that 
the possession is hostile or adverse.'' [Section 45, 
Adverse Possession, 2 Corpus Juris Secundum, 
page 558] 
yet such notice may arise or be deemed given by either 
of two methods : 
"The true owner must have actual knowledge 
of the hostile claim, 
OR 
the possession must be so open, visible, and no-
torious as to raise a presumption to, or knowl-
edge by him of the adverse claim''. [Section 45, 
Adverse P·ossession, 2 Corpus Juris Secundum, 
·page 558]. 
Certainly, in this case, in addition to the character 
of appellant's use, occupation, and possession of the 
ground in question, it appears that this adverse claim 
of right \Ya~ PERSON ALLY known and communicated 
to respondents. Respondents Davey vvere aware of the 
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4 
issuance of the tax deed, and, appellant offered to sell 
his adverse claims and interest to Davey [Rec. 82, 87, 
91], and appellant here, as early as 1941 [Rec. 42, 97] 
asserted his adverse claim by filing an action to quiet 
title against respondents. 
Respondent having the certainty of actual knowledge 
of appellant's adverse elaim to the ground, is bound by 
the rule that: 
''The owner's actual knowledge of the adverse 
possession is equivalent to, and dispenses with 
the necessity of, open and notorious possession.'' 
[Section 45, Adverse Pos.session, 2 Corpus Secun-
dum, page 559]. 
'' . . . . that is, he [adverse claimant] must 
show actual knowledge of the real ·owner that he 
claims in opposition to, and in definance of his 
title, or he must show such occupancy and user, 
so open, notorious, and inconsistent with as well 
as injurious to the rights of the true owner, that 
the law will authorize from such facts the pre .. 
sumption of such knowledge by the true owner. 
Heckesher v. Cooper, 203 Mo. 278, 293, 101 S. W. 
658, 662, quoting from Hennewell vs. Bushott, 
152 Mo. 611, 54 S. W. 487."- Burnside vs. Doo-
little, 24 S. W. 2nd 1011, 324 Mo. 722. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT DID TAKE POSSESSION OF THE 
GRO·UND, AND AS OCCUPANT USE IT FOR INVESTMENT, 
ETC., ADVERSELY. 
~eS'pondents' second point is directed to the thought 
that appellant "never took possession". They endeavor 
to make it appear that appellant never took pnssession 
of the ground and assert that it is controverted that 
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appellant went upon the ground. Respondents do not 
show any reference to facts in the record to disprove 
that appellant actually went upon the ground [Rec. 17-
19, 45-52] and thereby took 'possession-but only argue 
the statutory effect, from their viewpoint, of the pre-
sumptions they deduce from our statutes. 
However, respondents again omit the complete pic-
ture of the la,Y, by failing to note that, even in the case 
of a v<>id deed, that the following rule requiring initially 
an entry is all that is required at that time, as is indi-
cated: 
" .... A void deed doesn't operate to give 
the grantee constructive possession of the land 
where it is not shown to have been followed by 
an actual entry, it cannot serve to give adverse 
possession.''- [Section 129- Possession Under 
an Invalid Tax Deed, 1 American Juris prudence, 
Page 865]. 
Appellant's tax deed was prima facie valid and un-
assailed all through the years 1939 to 1951, but, assum-
ing even to the contrary, which is not conceded, still, 
under the principle above enun1erated, it cannot he said 
that appellant did not go upon the land, making his 
entry, and establish his possession [Rec. 17-19, 45-52], 
as so definitely asserted by respondents, and, there is 
no CONTRARY EVIDENCE to controvert the actual 
physical fact of his going and setting foot on the ground. 
Respondents' counsel in further argument under 
this second point makes the very misconstruction of Sec-
tion 104-2-7, U.C.A., 1943, or 104-12-7, Ch. 58, Session 
!jaws of Utah, 1951, against which they \Yere warned by 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
appellant's discussion under his point "(E)", entitled 
''Presumptions'' as set forth at page 13 of his brief, 
in assuming that the statute in question reads as '' .... 
the pers.on establishing THE legal title to such prop-
erty shall be presumed to have been possessed, etc ..... '' 
whereas in fact the statute reads: " .... the person 
establishing A legal title to such property, shall be pre-
sumed to have been [)Ossessed, etc ..... ", and assumes 
to claim for themselves the benefits of the presumption 
given by such statute, whereas actually, the presump-
tion is operative only after the determination of whether 
"A" legal title exists in appellant or respondent, or 
·both-in other words it is a case of putting the cart 
before the horse, to claim the benefit of the presumption 
before the determination of title is made. 
Respondents' counsel very blandly claims, without 
citing any authority therefor, that appellant's construc-
tion of the phrase, ''the ordinary use of the occupant'' 
[.A:ppellant 's Brief, pages 8-11], is the purpose, rather 
than the use, made of the land, and, just dismisses any 
further consideration of the matter fr·om his mind-and 
tries to lead the discussion away from that point by 
ignoring it, since he cannot refute it!! 
Purpose is defined as: ''That which one sets 
before himself as an object to be obtained, the 
end or aim t·o be kept in vie'¥ in any plan meas-
uring exertion or operation." [Webster's New 
International Dictionary, 2nd Edition]. 
Use is defined a.s: (Law) That enjoyment of 
property which consists in its e1nployment, occu-
pation, exercise or practise". [Webster's New 
Internati·onal Dictionary, 2nd Edition]. 
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\Y.ebster defines "to use" among other defi-
nitions as ''to n1ake use of'', ''to convert to one's 
service", ... to avail oneself of", "to put to a 
purpose''. [43 Words & Phrases, Permanent 
Edition, page 475]. 
''The 'vord 'use' is synonymous with employ-
ment. Common meaning of use is to employ for 
accomplishment of a purpose, turn to account.'' 
[43 \Y. ords & Phrases, Permanent Edition, page 
478]. 
No\Y all that is required by Section 104-2-9, Utah 
Code Annotated 1943, or Section 104-12-9, Chapter 58, 
Laws 1951, Pages 182-3, is that land be put to the'' ORDI-
NARY USE OF THE OCCUPANT". It certainly 
appears that the occupant has his choice of uses-merely 
because he chooses differently than respondent or re-
spondents' counsel would choose.- does not deprive him 
·of the benefits of the statute. 
Investment can be just as much of an employment 
or use, or turning to account, or accomplishment of an 
end as any other use or usage of ground. 
Century Dictionary defines the word invest 
as follows: ''To employ for some pr~ofitable use . 
. . . " [22 Words & Phrases, Permanent Edition, 
Pages 529-30]. 
The placing of capital or laying out of money 
in a 'vay intended to secure income or pr~ofit from 
its employment is an investment as that word is 
commonly used and understood.'' [22 Words & 
Phrases, Permanent Edition, Page 536]. 
The word ''invest'' 1neans to convert into 
son1e other form of wealth, usually of a more or 
less permanent value, to employ for son1e profit-
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able use, to plan so that it will be safe and yield 
a profit, . . . . [22 Words & Phrases, Permanent 
Edition, page 536]. 
The conclusion is inescapable that the appellant 
employed this pr~operty for his ordinary use, and that 
such use continued for more than seven years, with a 
consequent barring of respondents' rights-if any they 
had-in this ground. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT'S ACTS OF POSSESSION WERE MORE 
THAN CASUAL, OCCASIONAL TRESPASSES-ACTUALLY 
ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
Respondents' third point of argument is directed 
to attacking appellant's possession as casual and occa-
sional and without basis for adverse possession. 
There is no evidence in the record to show appellant 
originally entered or occupied the land as a tenant of 
respondent, or had any former possession of the land 
by reason of dealings with respondents. Appellants 
claimed under a tax deed-a wholly independent source 
of title-a claim which was manifested to respondents 
from the beginning, and brought hon1e to them imme-
diately, on the purchase from the county, and again 
when an action ·to quiet title was instituted against them 
in 1941. Respondents cannot plead ignorance of appel-
lant's adverse claims. 
Appellant took possession-he became an occupant 
by putting up signs and giving notice to all and sun-
dry of his claimed proprietorship of the land, he held 
it for a proper use, continuous and undisturbed, and 
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'vent upon the land from time to time to see that his 
signs and occupancy were uno:p·posed, he complained to 
the school authorities and had the school land fenced 
off from his land 'Yhen school children strayed off the 
playgrounds onto appellant's ground; he had the ground 
plowed-he never saw· the respondent there-he never 
had any interference with his originally ·established 
possession and the purpose for which he was holding 
the ground. Having once established himself as the 
occupant he continued to hold the possession, with a 
definite usage permitted him by la\Y-no one ever tried 
to put him off or barred his occupancy. 
POINT IV 
DOCTRINE OF DAY VS. STEELE DO·ES NO·T PRE-
CLUDE RECOVERY HERE BY APPELLANT-INAPPLICA-
BILITY. 
Respondents' fourth point relies upon the situation 
of Day vs. Steele, 111 Utah 481, 184 Pac. 2nd 216 to 
attempt to preclude appellant's recovery in this cause. 
. The gist of respondents' contention is that com-
parison of the facts of adverse possession as contended 
by him with respect to this case, make such a parallel 
with the situation in the Day vs. Steele Case as to 
bring it within the application of the principles there 
set forth. Respondents err, however, in overlooking 
the :point that many of the various acts of the appellant 
in this case are used only for the purpose of establishing 
his occupancy of the ground, rather than his whole 
case of adverse possession, and, appellant, under our 
theory, having established himself as occupant, is then 
at liberty to rely on his ordinary usage for investment, 
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etc., as such occupant to divest title from respondents 
by adverse possession, as shown in point '' (C) '' entitled 
Ordinary Use of the Occupant, pages 8-11, Appellant's 
Brief. 
Respondents (Page 9-10 their brief) quote at great 
length from the case of D. H. Peery Estat~e vs. Ford, 46 
Utah 436, 151 P. 59, at page 65, to further bolster their 
contentions anent adverse possession, but again over-
look the essential difference basic to the Peery case 
and the instant situation, which makes that alleged 
authority totally inapplicable here. There is here in-
volved the matter of adverse possession under a written 
instrument, while in the Peery Case, the dispute was 
over a parcel of surplus or excess ground, not originally 
within the deeded areas of either· of the con testing 
parties, and it did not appear from the actions detailed, 
that defendant's use was so equivocal as to make it an 
absolutely adverse usage. Such language from the 
quoted excerpt is therefore applicable to a wholly dif-
ferent situation than existed here. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT DID OCCUPY THE LAND CONTINU-
OUSLY, HOSTILELY, EXCLUSIVELY, OPENLY, AND NO-
TORIOUSLY. 
Respondents' fifth point, comprising the same iten1s 
as his first ·point, makes claim that there was no con-
tinuously hostile, open, notorious, and exclusive posses-
sion by appellant. 
Respondents assume that appellant's visits were 
limited to one per year, and that there -vvas something 
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clandestine, or stealthy in making the same; whereas 
the truth of the matter is other,Yise than the slurring 
inferences drawn by respondents. Appellant's visits 
were at least once a. year, and at times oftener [Rec. 
17-19, 45-52], and it does not appear that he went at 
night, by the light of a candle, or something of that sort, 
or at other out of the way times, but that he went openly, 
and at times with a ""Vvitness [Rec. 56]. Certainly su~ch 
course of action "\Yas open and above board. As pre-
viously set out, respondents were aware of appellant's 
adverse claims by direct notification-and open, notori-
ous possession was not needful to advise them of the 
appellant's adverse and hostile claims to the property-
but, even so, as respondent Davey testified, he himself 
found on the ground, appellant's "for rent" sign to in-
form him of appellant's claim to the ground as owner-
landlord!! And the court may judge from a comparis·on 
of exhibits ''G" and "H", just how little appellant's 
signs were as stated by the respondents! ! They weren't 
as microscopic as respondents would have us believe ! ! 
POINT VI 
TELONIS VS. STALEY DO·CTRINE SHOULD STILL BE 
ABROGATED. 
Respondents' sixth point, discussing appellant's 
argument for abrogating the continuance of the Rule of 
Telonis vs. Staley, saliently ignores the principle con-
tention of appellant, and then goes on to misstate the 
fact that the only ground for departure froin the rule 
and venturing into the reahns of conjecture revolves 
around a cited California decision. Perhaps it is good 
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tactics to ignore an argument that cannot well ·be re-
futed or readily answered, but, by so doing the implica-
tion of acquiescence arises. 
The language of our Supreme Court on page 517 of 
144 Pacific 2nd (Telonis vs. Staley, 104 Utah 537) makes 
it clear that lack of eurative statutes relating to the 
lack of the auditor's eertificate was a prime reason for 
holding it an essential step in the tax procedure, and in-
validating tax deeds based on proceedings where it ·was 
lacking-but, now, due to the fact that the enactment 
of Sections 104-2-5 to 104-2.5-11, Chapter 19, Session 
Laws of Utah, 1951, that general rather than specific 
curative acts are on the books in an attempt to cure all 
and not just some tax procedural flaws-the old reason 
for holding the affidavits essential no longer exists. Since 
the reason for the rule has gone by the board, the reason 
for holding to the doctrine of Telonis vs. Staley should 
no longer be held applicable to avoid tax sales. 
Further, when our Court has cited the California 
view applicable to a situation, as it did in construing 
similar Utah statutes to those of California, in Telonis 
vs. Staley, supra, it is in order to sho\v the illogical 
situation resulting from not applying the same strict-
ness of the rule in a case like Steele vs. San Luis Obispo, 
152 California 785, 93 Pacific 1020, as a basis for show-
ing how continued further a·pplication of the principle 
would result in an untoward holding, and, there is no 
venturing into conjectural fields, since the logic of the 
situation is that if the line of reasoning of the Cali-
fornia courts is followed in one instance, the same re-
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sults as they have achieved in other situations might 
follow here, too. 
POINT VII 
ALLEGED WRONGFUL ASSESSMENT OF NO AVAIL 
TO RESPONDENT. 
Respondents' seventh point, is a last ditch, desper-
ate effort, to save their case, should the ruling of this 
Honorable Court, as it should be, be adverse to their 
contentions. In the first place, it is to be noted that the 
basis of such error is alleged to be supported by re-
spondents' quoted extract from Tintic Undine Minilng 
Comp.any vs. Ercanbrack, 74 Pacific 2nd, 1184, 93 Utah 
561, which was by the very words of that ,case limited: 
'' . . . By what is here said we do not hold 
that in every case any one of the irregularities 
appearing in this record and set forth and enum-
erated as (a) to (k) inclusive renders a tax sale 
void. . . . '' [1189, 7 4 Pac. 2nd]. 
Further, respondents overlook the fact that irre-
spective of whether their claimed error in this last point 
is sustained or not, that if appellant's contentions with 
respect to adverse possession are sustained, as they 
ought to be, that that pur:p·orted defect, even if digni-
fied as such, is still of no avail to respondents since appel-
lant's title by adverse possession, even if the tax deed 
were defective on this last iten1, would still overcome 
the effect of such. 
For these reasons, and those set forth in appellant's 
original brief in this cause, it is therefore respectfully 
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urged that the holding and decree of the trial court be 
reversed in conformity with appellant's contentions as 
expressed on this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MILTON V. BACKMAN of 
BACKMAN' BACKMAN & CLARK 
and 
R. s. JOHNSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and A pp,ellarnt. 
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